Human Rights Brief
Volume 18

Issue 1

Article 1

2010

Ten Years After the Palermo Protocol: Where are Protections for
Human Trafficking?
Kelly Hyland Heinrich

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief
Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, International Law Commons, and the Law and Gender
Commons

Recommended Citation
Heinrich, Kelly Hyland. "Ten Years After the Palermo Protocol: Where are Protections for Human
Trafficking Victims?" Human Rights Brief 18, no.1 (2010): 2-5.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews
at Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Human Rights Brief by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law.
For more information, please contact kclay@wcl.american.edu.

Heinrich: Ten Years After the Palermo Protocol: Where are Protections for H

Ten Years After the Palermo Protocol:
Where are Protections for Human Trafficking Victims?
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Introduction

fronted by vigorous law enforcement action, victim protection,
and prevention efforts.5 The Report places countries’ anti-trafficking efforts in four groupings or tiers from which sanctions
and other actions can flow.6 Upon the release of each year’s
Report, the United States works in partnership with governments
worldwide to develop national action plans, support civil society
efforts, and generally make advancements in the interwoven
approaches of prosecution, protection, and prevention.

his year, we celebrate the 10-year anniversary of the
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking
in Persons, Especially Women and Children (Palermo
Protocol or Protocol),1 which introduced the concept of the
“3P” paradigm of prevention, victim protection, and prosecution efforts to combat modern slavery.2 Anniversaries, including
this one, afford us a moment to look back, celebrate accomplishments, and begin to chart a path forward. In 2001, in this
publication, I predicted that without strong protection measures,
the law enforcement efforts that the Protocol mandates for State
Parties would suffer.3 The conclusion was that the ultimate
measure of the Palermo Protocol’s impact would therefore
be determined by the level of victim protections State Parties
chose to incorporate into their domestic law. While ten years
may be too soon to judge,
an interim assessment is
important to gauge our
progress and point the
way forward. This article
aims to report on the current status of protections
afforded to trafficked
persons and how they are
connected to the success
of prosecution efforts,
focusing on what appear
to be the most egregious
violations of victim protections — the lack of
proactive identification,
victim services, and alternatives to detention and
deportation.

Human Trafficking in 2010
A decade of actual victims’ accounts has greatly aided our
understanding of human trafficking. Ten years ago, reports, studies, and programs focused primarily on women and girls and, to a
large degree, they still do. Today, however, there is greater recognition that men and boys
are also found in bondage in construction, food
service, manufacturing,
agriculture, begging, and
commercial sex industries.7 Women are found
trapped in commercial
sexual exploitation and
within various labor sectors including domestic
work, garment manufacturing, and agriculture.8
Prosecutors, service providers, and trafficked persons themselves can also
speak to the fact that the
year 2000’s depiction of
victims as naïve, uneducated, duped or kidnapped
is an unhelpful and offensive stereotype.9 The portrayal of the weak and easily duped
victim ignores the impulse, necessity, and agency of many who
seek a better life in the face of difficult circumstances, even at
the risk of being in harm’s way. The reality today is that people
seeking and accepting employment are finding themselves in
coercive situations at the hands of their employers and pimps.
The outdated focus on international or cross-border trafficking
is diminishing as well, with more governments recognizing that
the term “trafficking” as set forth in the Palermo Protocol does
not connote movement, but is instead a crime of compelled
service, and that a significant number of trafficking victims
never travel any distance or cross a border; governments are
recognizing that their own citizens are trafficking victims within
their borders. We have also learned that traffickers are adap-

The portrayal of the weak and
easily duped victim ignores
the impulse, necessity, and
agency of many who seek a
better life in the face of difficult
circumstances, even at the risk
of being in harm’s way.

Background
The U.S. Department of State’s Office to Monitor and
Combat Trafficking in Persons leads the U.S. government’s
diplomatic engagement on the issue of human trafficking. The
Office is mandated by the U.S. Congress to produce the annual
Trafficking in Persons Report,4 which is then used as a tool to
encourage government progress from one year to the next. The
Report is distinct in that it focuses on trafficking not only as a
violation of human rights norms, but also as a crime to be con* Kelly Hyland Heinrich, Esq. is Senior Policy Advisor in the Office
to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons at the U.S. Department
of State.
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Therefore, State Parties should not dismiss the Protocol’s
protection measures as discretionary. Instead, they should be
understood as critical, integral components of the Protocol’s
mandatory law enforcement requirements that are in keeping
with the tenets of the modern crime victims’ rights movement
that has emerged in many countries over the last thirty years. The
Protocol outlines services that are meant to assist and protect
trafficked persons. Article 6 requires that State Parties consider
implementing services for trafficked persons’ physical and psychological recovery, including medical care, housing, mental
health counseling, job training, legal assistance, and physical
safety.16 Article 7 requires State Parties to consider providing
temporary or permanent residence for victims. Article 8 requires
State Parties to facilitate the repatriation of citizens or nationals with due regard for the safety of the victim by providing
necessary travel documentation and a return without unreasonable delay.

tive, responsive and seek out zones of vulnerability that result
from weak criminal penalties, lax law enforcement, unregulated
labor recruitment and temporary worker programs, and changing migration patterns. It is unclear in the ten years since the
Palermo Protocol whether trafficking itself has changed or
whether our understanding of the phenomenon has aligned with
the realities of modern slavery around the world.

Victim Protection in the Context of the Protocol’s
Mandatory Prosecution Provisions
The Palermo Protocol’s most observable result has been
its rapid adoption by 141 countries as of October 2010.10 The
achievement of consensus on an agreed upon definition of
trafficking in persons rooted in exploitation, and the resulting
criminal laws that countries have adopted to comply with the
Protocol, cannot be understated. An enacted law, however, is
only as good as its enforcement. Thousands of traffickers worldwide have been
brought to justice over the
decade.11 Yet, the number
of convictions both annually and in the aggregate is
too low to reflect even the
most conservative estimates
of the problem. By the U.S.
Department of State’s calculation, from 2008 to 2009,
State Parties collectively
convicted 4,166 traffickers
worldwide.12 Many governments reported just one or
two convictions. According
to the United Nations Office
on Drugs and Crime, 62
State Parties have never convicted a single trafficker.13
Moreover, just 33514 of the
4,166 convictions were for
labor trafficking, despite
millions of persons known to
suffer in forced labor around
the world. As I suggested in
2001, the Palermo Protocol
represented an opportunity to improve law enforcement outcomes both quantitatively and qualitatively by protecting and
assisting victims. However, in 2010, the most common antitrafficking strategy remains enforcement-only, relegating victim
protection to a secondary role rather than a complementary or
necessary role. This undercuts not only victim assistance, but
also hampers the very enforcement mandated by the Protocol.
Clumsy responses that arrest, detain, or deport victims only
serve to thwart identification and the opportunity to empower
victims to testify against their trafficker. Additionally, programs
that condition services on extensive cooperation or, even worse,
a successful prosecution have the effect of shifting the burden
to the victims, placing them in a situation where refusing
services and going underground becomes an understandable
response.15

Taken as a whole, these
measures, if implemented,
would constitute a nascent
international version of
a crime victim’s bill of
rights and would guide a
truly effective law enforcement response to modern
slavery. These provisions
recognize that trafficked
persons require alternatives to systems in which
repatriation or deportation
is the default outcome, such
as services, work authorization, and legal immigration status. Unfortunately,
these core protection principles are sparsely applied
by many State Parties and
are wholly absent in too
many countries. Victim protections are not in conflict
with tough law enforcement.
Implementation of proactive
victim identification, funded
victims services, and alternatives to detention and deportation would respect trafficked
persons’ human rights and yield better prosecution results.

Programs that condition
services on extensive
cooperation or, even worse,
a successful prosecution
have the effect of shifting the
burden to the victims, placing
them in a situation where
refusing services and going
underground becomes an
understandable response.

Victim Identification – Not Just a Law
Enforcement Responsibility
While attempts to estimate the magnitude and scope of human
trafficking have often failed, adopting even the most conservative
estimates puts the number of victims worldwide in the millions,17 yet
governments only identified approximately 50,000 victims worldwide last year.18 This falls far short of reflecting the scope of the problem or the population that needs protections. Similarly hidden crimes
such as sexual assault or domestic violence are vastly underreported
and it is reasonable to assume comparable underreporting for human
trafficking, especially as traffickers often convince their victims that
the police are to be feared rather than thought of as potential rescu3
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ers.19 As a result, some governments interpret the disparity between
estimated and identified victims as a sign that there is not a significant trafficking problem in their country. Still others claim that their
anti-trafficking efforts have been successful in reducing the number
of identified victims. In both instances, NGOs simultaneously report
large numbers of escaped victims who do not trust police enough to
go to them for help. At this point in the modern anti-slavery effort, too
few cases have been brought in total for a decrease in arrests or convictions to stand as an indicator of success. Successful governmental
interventions should instead be marked by an increase in the number
of traffickers brought to justice and a similar increase in the number
of victims protected.

than a criminal, many State Parties continue to arrest and detain
trafficked persons. A staggering 104 countries do not have laws
prohibiting the deportation of trafficked persons.21 Trafficked
persons are misidentified most frequently as either unauthorized migrants or as criminals who have committed offenses that
the trafficker forced them to perform, despite the Protocol’s
policy of non-culpability.22 Even recognized trafficked victims
are knowingly jailed. This practice manifests in three ways.
First, they are detained in preparation for deportation. In some
countries, trafficked persons are detained alongside criminals,
thereby equating the two and instilling the trafficked person
with fear, shame, and a false sense of wrongdoing. Second,
they are detained for a specified period of time during which
they are required to meet with law enforcement prior to their
eventual deportation, regardless of any cooperation. In some
instances, law enforcement takes down a written statement, after
which the witness is deported. Whether this is a way to hasten
deportation or a misguided effort to ease the victim’s burden is
unknown. Such early statements can harm not only the victim,
but also the prosecution. First accounts are often incomplete
or inaccurate due to fear and psychological impairments and
deportation may prevent a victim from being offered services.
In other instances, a prosecutor may meet with a detained trafficked person for the first time shortly before trial, which does
not allow enough time for the victim to trust the prosecutor,
feel invested in the process, or be calmed about confronting
their trafficker.23 Third, victims are often detained in what the
government dubs a “shelter” that is nothing but a secure detention facility.24 They are not permitted to leave and there are no
services. The time they spend in the facility is considered under
the country’s laws to be temporary residence during which time
they should reflect on whether or not to cooperate with law
enforcement. In these cases, the law masquerades as temporary
residence, shelter, and return, but the reality is incarceration,
detention, and deportation.

State Parties must use criminal law to vindicate the violation
of trafficking victims’ most basic human rights. Human trafficking is a crime and governments are being held accountable
whether in the Trafficking in Persons Report or in international
tribunals,20 for using criminal law to vindicate the violation of
the victims’ most basic human rights. However, as stated above,
criminal law enforcement likely uncovers only a small fraction
of victims; fear of law enforcement makes them more likely to
report to other trusted individuals and organizations. Therefore,
State Parties should support nongovernmental organizations
to identify trafficked persons in concert with protective law
enforcement practices. If law enforcement does not demonstrate
a capacity to treat victims with compassion, there is no incentive
for NGO service providers to refer their clients to the police.
To improve victim identification, we need to move beyond
an enforcement-only approach to an interdisciplinary whole-ofgovernment approach. For example, labor ministries are in the
position to be detecting a whole range of activities constituting
labor exploitation, of which compelled service is the extreme
manifestation. Increased identification could result from targeted,
proactive enforcement efforts in industries where human trafficking has been found and where populations are most vulnerable,
typically low wage employment sectors. Other ministries could
also be involved. To provide further examples, to what extent
are education ministries working to identify trafficked youth
recruited within and away from schools? Are health ministries
training emergency personnel and health care workers to identify
trafficked persons? Are ministries for women and children screening for trafficking within sexual assault and domestic violence
contexts as well as child protection systems? Are immigration
authorities asking the right questions at the border and in detention centers? This is the essence of proactive identification – tailored strategies to find trafficked persons based on evidence of
existing or suspected trafficking. NGOs are replete with examples
of missed opportunities for victim identification in emergency
rooms, immigration detention centers, at border entry points,
and during labor inspections. NGO service providers and victims
themselves have good information on how victims are identified
and in whom they trusted to confide in and seek help. This is useful data, in addition to law enforcement characterizations of victim populations, on which to base proactive identification efforts.

Ironically, these government practices validate traffickers’
threats that law enforcement will arrest, detain, and deport them
if they escape. In each of these scenarios, trafficked persons
are devalued, used for the information they can provide, and
treated as if they are criminals. These harmful practices send a
message that the government does not care about the trafficked
person, so why should the trafficked person feel compelled to
assist the government? Not only is there no incentive for trafficked persons to cooperate, but these measures are punitive and
re-traumatizing. Adding insult to injury, a response in which
deportation is the default response means no assessment of danger upon return, no reintegration, serious risk of the traffickers’
retaliation or retrafficking, and potential criminal consequences.
Other State Parties may provide eligibility for limited services as outlined by the Protocol, but the burden and responsibility of funding victim services often falls to nongovernmental
organizations. In countries where there is no civil society to
speak of, victim services is a largely unmet need. With limited
budgets, service-providing organizations are either unable to
meet all of the vast needs of victims whom they assist, or they
are unable to assist all of the victims that seek their help. Shelter,
general health care, legal services, and mental health care, in
particular, are expensive to provide and require financial support
from State Parties.

Services, Shelter, and Immigration Status Versus
Detention and Deportation
Despite the Protocol’s promotion of humanitarian treatment,
which would correspond with status as a crime victim rather
4
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Victim protections are not in conflict with tough
law enforcement. Implementation of proactive victim
identification, funded victims services, and alternatives
to detention and deportation would respect trafficked
persons’ human rights and yield better prosecution results.
In some of these countries, even when services are offered,
victims are not eligible for temporary work authorization.
Trafficked persons often incur debts to achieve a work opportunity or they have family members relying on their remittances;
the inability to work and pay down the debt or support the family
therefore weighs significantly on a trafficked person even when
services are being offered. For that reason alone, a trafficked
person may choose not to report the crime or to continue assisting law enforcement. If the house used for collateral is about to
be repossessed or loan sharks are threatening family members,
the trafficked person will not want to reflect upon whether to
assist law enforcement. To ignore this basic economic necessity
is detrimental to the well-being of the trafficked person as well
as the investigation and prosecution of the trafficker.

assistance, reducing identification, spoiling the opportunity to
empower victims to testify against their traffickers, and impeding the enforcement mandated by the Protocol.

Conclusion
Human trafficking investigations and prosecutions are tremendously complex. Convictions often depend on the strength
of victims’ cooperation and their ability to confront their traffickers in court, which means law enforcement must spend
countless hours working to gain victims’ trust, obtain the full
account of the crime, and prepare for trial. Who is more likely
to be an effective victim-witness — the person awaiting deportation behind bars or the person receiving restorative support services? Prosecution and protection are therefore as inextricably
intertwined in practice as they are in the Protocol.

The majority of State Parties condition the provision of services on cooperation with law enforcement to varying degrees.
The Protocol’s protection provisions are silent on this practice, but overall encourage a compassionate and humanitarian
response with due regard for the trafficked person’s physical and
mental recovery. NGOs have long advocated that providing services and helping to restore the victim aids in the victim’s ability
to cooperate with law enforcement and be a more effective victim-witness. However, few State Parties offer services to victims
prior to their cooperation with law enforcement; some require
extensive cooperation or even a successful prosecution before
making services available. In these instances, the requirement
of a decision to undertake extensive cooperation, forced upon
the victim when they are recently liberated and still suffering
from the physical and psychological ramifications, may serve as
a disincentive for NGOs to recommend that their clients come
forward. Where there are no meaningful victim protections or
opportunities to stabilize the victim before making choices of
such import, the voluntariness of the victim’s decision is called
into question. This is yet another example of undercutting victim

Without the implementation of the fundamental concept of the
interdependence between prosecution and protection that is set
forth in the Palermo Protocol, State Parties will continue to misplace their resources and efforts. Adoption of protection measures
— victim identification through a whole-of-government approach
and comprehensive services to potential victims along with work
authorization and legal immigration status — would respect trafficked persons’ human rights and yield better prosecution results.
The promise of the Palermo Protocol was in its recognition
that we will never prosecute trafficking away. We will never
identify trafficked persons by waiting for them to come to us.
We will never have a complete anti-trafficking response with a
singular approach. In the next ten years, on the occasion of the
Palermo Protocol’s 20th anniversary, let us hope that we can
point to a decade in which State Parties did not see victim protections as a luxury or a nuisance, but as an integral part of the
interlocking paradigm of prevention, protection and prosecution
that helps us deliver on the promise of freedom.
HRB
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